[note: This article, belatedly published here, was originally written by Idan Landau in his Hebrew Blog "Lo Lamut Tipesh" (don't die stupid), it contains links to several sources. whenever possible I've provided english versions of the links. However, some of the links are for blogs, some for media articles with no available translation. Those links were left as they are - in Hebrew.)
How can we know what the future holds? That's a timeless human dilemma. How can we know what's happening now? That's probably a modern dilemma, one that comes with life in a society whose perception of reality goes through propaganda agents filters. And how can we know what has already happened? Here we are victims of the bitter struggle between memory and forgetfulness, between perception and selection.
How will we remember "Cast Lead"? Here's a good answer: we'll remember it in the way it (the war? The operation? The incursion? The defensive fighting?) was depicted in the newspapers supplements of the one year's anniversary of it. A year after the first day of the attack, the struggle over its representation in the collective memory is starting to show signs of fading. In a year or two (and an attack or two) and the formal version – "they threw Qassams on us and we didn't retaliate, eventually we kicked their ass and they stopped the shooting" – this version will become from just another narrative to "the true history", the rest of the versions will be drown out in the vast spaces of the internet as a flickering conspiracy theories.
That is why the anniversary of "Cast Lead", is one last chance for the ones who opposed this attack from its beginning, for its criticizers, for the ones who where appalled by it, to show, perhaps for the last time, the perception of reality as they comprehended it and experienced it, from the months prior to the attack to the findings revealed after the dust of the bombings went down.
The summary that follows, I'll say in advance, is a selective one. It does not contain one word (except for the death toll) on what the Israeli side experienced. The barrages of missiles on the south, the life in bomb shelters, the deployment of the home front authorities etc. Don't worry, of those the average Israeli will get more than enough, in every media channel available. This is their selection. Whoever took the trouble of entering this blog, admitted in doing so, that he is interested in what was left out of the mainstream covering eye.
A lot was left out, and from this one also needs to choose. In my summary I've decided to focus on the aspects that strike me as most crucial to the molding of every Israeli citizen in the future. Knowing what really happened between the 27th of December 2008 and the 17th of January 2009 isn't enough. One needs to know how those events where enabled, what are the military and propaganda mechanisms that made them happen. That's because the events themselves were left behind, but the darkness mechanisms are still with us, and already working hard on the next attack. It is not necessary to explain what happens to one who doesn't learn from his own past.
This summery is divided into several chapters. The first chapter examines the series of events and oversights that led to "Cast Lead". It's primary goal – to prove the avodability and unnessesarity of the attack, and to point out the hidden goals behind it, more thoroughly than it has been done before. The second chapter examines the death toll and the distressing gaps between the IDF versions (which are classified) to the human rights organizations versions (which are open to the public). The third chapter discusses the evidences and proofs of war crimes, which clearly contradicts the IDF denials. The fourth chapter describes the "spirit of the commander" which loomed over the operation, in the briefings and in the opening fire policy – as testimonies from within the IDF reveals. The fifth and final chapter looks on the investigation options that are available for one who is really bothered by the documented findings.
The Operation Goal was not Eliminating the Rockets Threat from the Southern Settlements: Step by Step
The rational behind "Cast Lead", as marketed by Israel, was to provide a response to the rockets launched by Hamas on the south of Israel in recent years. Indeed, the thousands of rockets that fell on Sderot and the settlements bordering the Gaza strip in recent years made the life of the people in the south unbearable. At least from that aspect, one cannot doubt the fundamental justification of an action that was meant to bring the sanity back to the life of the people of the south.
But this wasn't the goal of "Cast Lead". Those things were discussed in a few leftist sites, but were drowned in the never ending propaganda noise that surrounds the operation for a year, that is why their importance can't be overstated. Level-headed analysis of the events in the second half of 2008 clearly reveals that removing the rockets threat from the southern settlements could not have been the real goal of the operation. That's because there was an immediate, cheap and non-violent way to do so. But the Israeli leadership favored, from reasons that deserve to be pondered about, the way of fire and death.
We're talking here about a one and a half year old history, history that was already buried beneath mountains of written words. In order to restore it, we should rewind our clocks to the 19th of June 2008 – the day in which the cease fire agreement (the Thahadia) between Israel and Hamas began. Also we need to look on the details of the shooting at that time through a magnifying glass.
The Cease Fire
Well, this is how what should not have happen, happened.
Till the cease fire took place, things were in turmoil. According to IDF data, in 2006 1,744 rockets and mortars was fired from the Gaza strip to southern Israel, and in 2007 1,934 rockets were fired.
The cease fire began in the 19th of June 2008 and wad supposed to end in the 19th of December, 6 months afterward. The agreement, reached through Egyptian mediation, mainly stated a complete cease fire between the two fighting sides, and opening the border-crossings to commodities from Israel.
There were military actions on both sides, but according to the unwritten understandings between Israel and Hamas they were not considered as a casus beli. The politicians blamed each other for internal gains: they blamed us for breaking the agreement and we blamed them. Both sides were right, but both sides also knew that the low level of the fighting is much favorable to what took place before June 2008. In any case, the usual Israeli claim that Hamas broke the cease fire repeatedly doesn't have a leg to lean on. In fact, in the first week of the cease fire, 7 Israeli violations were registered and only one violation by Hamas.
In regard to the opening of the border crossings – Israel did not meet her obligations. In fact during the cease fire fewer supplies entered Gaza than in the beginning of 2006, when rocket firing was at its peak. The Israeli narrative according to which one side (us) met his full obligations while the other side (them) is breaking every one of his – is a propaganda lie. This propaganda played a major role in recruiting the public support for "cast lead", because if the other side is breaking the agreements, there is no other option but using force.
The Numbers Don't Lie
Did Hamas keep the truce? The answer is yes, almost completely (the few violations were committed mainly by other organizations). It is important to show this by numbers, because on the "violations" lie Israel has based a campaign of deception.
Well, how many rockets were fired to southern Israel in the first half of 2008, till the cease fire agreement? This datum took very winding ways to reach. After strenuous search it became apparent that the most accurate segmentation of the rocket firing, to the single day level was to be found in the ISA (Israel Security Agency) databases. This is how 2008 looked like – before and after the cease fire
The total of rocket fired from Gaza during 2008 – app. 3600. From the beginning of the cease fire till the end of the year 664 rockets were fired. That is, till the 19th of June 2.936 rockets were fired. In average, 17 rockets per day.
One would assume that the 664 rockets fired from Gaza from the beginning of the cease fire till the end of 2008 proves that the cease fire didn't work. But the opposite is true. Apparently until the 4th of November, a key date that we'll come back to shortly, only 50 rockets were fired. Spread across 4 and half months, we talk about one rocket per 3 days in average.
That is, from 17 rockets every day the cease fired calmed the fire to the level of one rocket every 3 days. An agreement that lowers the fire level times 50, is without a doubt a working agreement. Not only that, the fire level was decreasing constantly as the cease fire continued. 18 rockets in July, 19 rockets in August, 5 rockets in September and 4 rockets in October. October 2008 was the most peaceful month the southern settlements people knew for years. Throughout the cease fire, until the 4th of November, not a single Israeli citizen was killed or injured by rockets fired.
Not only the numbers, but Sderot residents also tell the same story: the cease fire period was a period of prosperity and recovering that everyone hoped will continue. Indeed, everyone also knew that Hamas is using this period to arm itself, but wait a second, what exactly did the IDF do in the same time? Made shovels out of his sabers? Or else acquired and utilized innovative weapons systems, tried for the first time on Gaza residents? The mutual acquiring of weapons is a fact of life concerning national conflicts, the important question is which side is trying all the nonviolent options he has before choosing to use the obtain weapons.
And then We Grew Tired from Peace
In the 4th of November everything collapsed. It was Israel's' fault.
IDF soldiers infiltrated the strip and reached a distance of 250 meters from the border in order to blast a tunnel that was dug in order to, according to Israel, kidnap Israeli soldiers. The tunnel was trapped with explosives and blew up. In the battle that followed the soldiers killed 6 Hamas fighters. Immediately, and not a moment before that, the usual pirouette began. In one day 66 rockets were fired to southern Israel – more than in the whole four and a half months of the cease fire prior to that day. The Israeli air force attacked, more deaths and injuries, hermetic closure of the border crossings, the darkening of Gaza and stopping of the humanitarian aid.
In November 2008, 233 rockets were fired compared to only 4 rockets in October. Breaking the cease fire by the IDF increased the Qassams firing overnight by times 60.
This graph, taken from the ISA site tells the story:

At first Israel admitted half heartedly that she has broken the cease fire. But immediately she added: "last week incursion made in order to blow up the tunnel took place in order to maintain the cease fire. It was evident to Israel that a terror attack made through that tunnel would have brought an end to the cease fire. Despite this, Hamas was trying to renew his terror attacks while breaking all terms of the cease fire".
In simple terms: we broke the cease fire in order for them not to break it before us. In the Israeli discourse this obviously doesn't count as a breach of the cease fire, we call it an "incursion". But the naked facts show this was the turning point that started the fire, fire that almost went out during October 2008. Whoever authorized the incursion, whoever chose to do it even with the high price (6 casualties) Hamas paid, took the consequences into account.
Try to imagine this alternative scenario: Israel and Hamas reach the end of the cease fire agreement, the 19 of December 2008, in a state of full ceased fire. Months without rockets and without incursions and air raids. In this situation, the agreement would have been most likely renewed, this time with potential to advance into more delicate matters – the releasing of Gilad Shalit and taking the cease fire also to the west bank. Before we would have noticed, we could find ourselves in the midst of a de facto peace process with Hamas.
The horror.
Could this be what initiated the incursion in the 4th of November? Or else the incursion was just an opportunity, and things have already decided 6 months prior to that when the operational plans for "Cast Lead" were made? According to Tzvi Bar'el analysis, Israel broke the cease fire in Gaza because there was no way she would have agreed to take it to the west bank. The assassination of the cease fire, on the backs of the residents of southern Israel, was meant to eliminate any chance of Hamas will replace the puppet forces of Abu Mazen as the body who manages the conflict with Israel.
Hamas wanted to continue the cease fire
And what about Hamas? Did he want to continue the cease fire? Surprisingly enough, the answer is yes. Here also, everything is documented, and contradicts the official narrative of Israel who wants to show Hamas as a chronic negotiations refusnik.
Immediately after the end of the cease fire Mahmud A-Zahar declared in an interview to channel 10 news, addressing the Israeli government directly, that Hamas wants to prolong the cease fire for 6 additional months following the original terms, that is to say, Hamas drops his demands to take the cease fire to the west bank. Israel replied that she won't talk with Hamas about a cease fire agreement. He repeated this statement in the Egyptian press as well. A week after Haled Mash'al issued a similar statement. Again – Israel ignored that.
In this stage our appeasement refusniks to dismiss the statements of the Arabs – it is after all, a well known fact, that Arabs only tell the truth when they are pining for war an lie through their teeth when they are talking about peace. Embarrassingly enough, our own "national estimators" thought Hamas intentions were genuine. In the 21st of December, two days after the cease fire ended, yuval diskin the head of the ISA stated that "Make no mistake, Hamas is interested in continuing the truce, but wants to improve its terms. It wants us to lift the siege [on Hamas-ruled Gaza], stop [IDF] attacks, and extend the truce to include Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]“.
Here is a good place to mention that this demands of Hamas was absolutely justified. The right that Israel reserved for herself to stop the fire in Gaza while continuing it in the west bank reflect a totally unilateral separation ideology, according to which there is no connection between Hamas in Gaza and Hamas in Nablus. Hamas could all the same declare that he will stop firing on Sderot but continue to fire on Ashkelon.
Anyway, as we mentioned, even this justified demand (to take the cease fire to the west bank) Hamas dropped two days later. It didn’t help. The Israeli war machine galloped forward.
As usual here, when the war drums are banging, the media remains silent. A lone voice that publicly declared that “this was not necessary” in real time was Nehemia Strasler of Ha’aretz. (On the same day I have issued my own call for refusal) the question – why of all others a journalist that specializes in economy was able to recognize the spin that led to the war – is an interesting one. An economy journalist of all others, because our political and security commentators are linked with too thick chains to the systems they cover to develop a dissident perspective in real time. Strasler of all others, because we are talking about a “state hating” journalist who always casts doubt on the abilities and meanings of the state. Paradoxically when it comes to the social-economic, the undermining of the states privileges puts Strasler on the side of the power and money wielding, when it comes to the political, the same undermining puts him on the side of the political deprived people (Who knows, maybe if we could let the “efficient market forces” run the war instead of the state, Strasler would have supported it).
The Israeli stands were hollow, deprived of content. Nobody said it better than Sderot resident Na’amika Zion in the profound article she published in the midst of the attack:
“The first time I felt that the state really protects me was when the cease fire agreement was reached. I have no responsibility toward Hamas, and that is why I ask our leaders. Have you turn every stone to achieve continued cease fire? To prolong it? To reach a long term agreement? To solve the border crossings problem and the blockade? Have you traveled to the end of the world looking for suitable mediators? And why have you dismissed in a blink of an eye the French initiative to cease the fire after war broke out? And why to this very moment you continue to decline any possible offer for negotiations? Have we not reached the quota of Qassams we are able to suffer? Have we not reached the quota of dead Palestinian children the world can live with?”
“And who says we can take Hamas down? Haven’t we already tried this trick somewhere else? Who will come in his place? Fundamental global organizations? Al-Qaeda? And how from under the destruction, the hunger, the cold and the death, moderate voices of peace will emerge? Where are you taking us? What future do you promise us here in Sderot?”
Zion exaggerated only in this: our leaders didn’t need to “turn every stone” or “travel to the end of the world” in order to maintain the cease fire. All that was needed was to say yes to the clear and justified suggestions that came from Gaza and Damascus.
This conclusion should be cut and save toward the next conflict in Gaza which our captains are already working hard to make unavoidable.
So, what did we fight for?
If not for the peace of Sderot, as Na’amika Zion understood, so for something else. The real goal was bringing down the Hamas regime. And in this goal malice and stupidity were merged. Malice, because our leaders – Olmert, Barak, Livni and Ashkenazi – knew all too well that the human price of the operation, with its brutal opening fire protocols, would be horrible, and that in the end of the day, the rockets threat on southern Israel will not be removed. Stupidity, because the same leaders have not learned anything from our near history – it is impossible to overthrow a hostile regime by massacring the population he controls. Indeed thanks to the operation Hamas hold in Gaza is more stable than ever (same as Hezbollah hold in the Lebanese leadership after the second Lebanon war).
The evidence of overthrowing Hamas was the real goal of the operation are numerous and were covered in other places. The Olmert government publicly declared this strategic goal before and through the operation. The target chosen – government buildings in Gaza, offices, health and education infrastructure – tell us that the military branch of Hamas wasn’t the only things on the sights of Israel. Chief commentators talked about it (Alex Fishman, “yediot ahronot”, 23.1.09: “the two last parts of the operation were meant to overthrow Hamas, to enable Israel to control the smuggling mechanism, and to change the government”), but the main version, the one that was constantly repeated by the propaganda agents, and unfortunately convinced most of the scared residents of southern Israel, was – “to remove the threat of rockets from the south of Israel”. It sounds better, more righteous than some wild brutal delusion of changing the government in Gaza.
A year after the rockets threat became bigger, reached Tel Aviv, and the Hamas government in Gaza is stronger than ever. Israel is isolated like never before, the economic boycott on her is getting closer step by step, and her top officials are avoiding European capitals for fear of being arrested.
Death toll
On the Israeli side the picture is clear: 13 Israelis were killed during the operation. 9 by Palestinians, 3 of them civilians and 6 were soldiers. 4 soldiers were killed by friendly fire.
On casualties on the Palestinian side there is a dispute.
The IDF data (April 2009): 1,166 casualties, from which 709 Hamas and Jihad activists; 295 civilians, from which 138 children under 16 and women, and 162 men over 16 who were not identified.
B’zelem data (September 2009): 1,387 casualties, from which 773 not involved in the fighting, including 309 children and 109 women. 330 of the casualties were active fighters, 248 were cops of Palestinian police.
Let’s start with the cops. All 248 cops were killed on the first day of the operation, during air raids on the Palestinian police headquarters and 18 more police stations. IDF counts them as Hamas casualties, though there is no reliable data on their organizational affiliation. What is clear – none of theme were actively participating in fighting during the surprise attack of the air force (42 of them were freshly nominated cadets). Police is a civilian body, therefore the massacre of cops is probably a crime of war.
How many Palestinian civilians were killed? The max number according to the IDF is 457 (civilians+not identified). The min number according to B’zelem is 773. The minimal gap is therefore 316 civilians. If we stretch the gap to the maximum (adding cops, removing unidentified) we reach 726.
That is – the IDF denies killing between 316 to 726 Palestinian civilians, that according to B’zelem he is definitely responsible for being dead. Not a small gap.
B’zelem is a serious organization. He visited homes of casualties and hospitals, collected death certificates, pictures and evidence about 363 children (under 16) a women that were killed. According to the IDF “only” 138 women and children were killed.
So, B’zelem has evidence of the death of at least 225 women and children during “Cast Lead” that the IDF denies responsibility for. Just imagine – 225 women and children in Israel, killed in a terror attack which no organization took responsibility for. We’ll add here that the data collected by Amnesty International is very close to the B’zelem data. App 1,400 casualties, form which 300 were children and 115 women.
What is the IDF doing with this data? Is anybody there bothered by these large gaps in the numbers of the casualties? Did anybody in the “constantly introspective” army at least contacted B’zelem in order to compare data and evidence?
Of course not. The IDF is above mistakes. Not only no appeal to B’zelem made, but from 20 appeals made by the organization to the army, regarding incidents were civilians were shot and killed during “Cast Lead” only one resulted an inquiry (using of “human shields”).
The casualty lists comprised by B’zelem and Amnesty International are open for the public. The casualty list comprised by the IDF – classified. Any requests to declassify it were refused. What is the reasonable excuse for that refusal? Why does the casualty list need to be a secret? Maybe the IDF is afraid to let some of the casualties that they are in fact dead, in order to not sadden them? And maybe, just like any aspect of this operation – starting from keeping journalist out of Gaza to the refusing cooperation with the Goldstone committee – the IDF spokesman believes in “minimum information, minimum critique”? What else needs to happen in order for our leaders to finally understand – when we are closing are eyes – the atrocities don’t go away, someone else still sees them.
.Is B’zelem mistake proofed? No. Of course not. But one can assume that at least in the aspect of field investigation in Gaza, the database of B’zelem is richer than the IDF’s. An army that was really interested in reaching the truth, and face the hard data of civilian killings in Gaza, would not have kept such an impassive silence facing such evidences that so harshly counter its official position. It would have tried to cooperate with anybody who could offer such important and elementary information.
Nowadays the IDF praises himself with the fact that the ratio of civilian killings in “Cast Lead” was “only” 1 out of 4. Such ratio would have, without a doubt, made the hair on the back of Israel past leaders – Ben Gurion, Dayan, even Begin – stand in horror and shame. But times have changed. I wonder what these leaders would think of a civilian killing ratio of 7 out of 10 as the B’zelem data suggests.
Evidences for Crimes of War
During the attack and in the weeks that followed, many evidences and proofs of massive damage to civilian population which was not involved in the fighting were gathered. The evidences are first of all the hundreds of civilian casualties; physical remnants of weapons that the international law strictly restricts their use; victims’ testimonies; medical reports made by doctors and paramedics; and finally, testimonies of IDF soldiers.
The automatic response made by IDF and other Israeli spokesman was that Hamas turned the civilian population in Gaza into “human shield”. But, no basis was ever found for this claim. In fact, there are not a few testimonies, including ones that made by soldiers, of the use the IDF made of Palestinians as human shields.
“Amnesty International did not find any evidence to Hamas or any other Palestinian organization broke the rules of war to the extent that Israel repeatedly claimed they have done. Especially, the organization didn’t find any evidence to Hamas or other warriors directed civilians’ movement in a manner that will protect military objects. However, Amnesty International did find that in some occasion during “Cast Lead” Israeli forces used Palestinians as “human shields”. In any case the international humanitarian law clarifies that using human shields by one of the fighting sides does not excuses the attacking force from his legal duties regarding civilians.
Amnesty International representatives interviewed many Palestinians which complained about Hamas behavior, especially oppression and attacks on Hamas opossers, including killing, torture and random arrests. However, Amnesty International did not receive any complaints of Gaza’s residents about Hamas fighters using them as human shields”
(From Amnesty International report).
Hamas fighters did operate from populated areas, but in fact they were not the ones that chose the fight scene anyway, because Israel by deciding to demolish the Palestinian administrative and governmental buildings localized the fighting in those populated areas.
The Israeli media dealt much with the unimportant rather than the main issues. It concentrated on the messengers rather on the message. Individuals and organizations that claimed or showed proofs for crimes of war made by the IDF were personally attacked (and on this issue the media almost absolutely joined ranks with the IDF spokesman). Their personal backgrounds were searched, their sources of funds, their so called ignorance of Hamas crimes – anything not to discuss the issues themselves. This policy, as we now know, exploded in Israel face with the publishing of the Goldstone report and the wave of sues issued against Israeli leaders in European courts.
This heavy media screening caused us to forget (and this was its main goal) the evidences and proofs themselves. That’s why we should, especially in those days when Israel fights with half of the world about sayings, metaphors and righteousness shows, go back to the hurtful, horrifying facts of “Cast Lead”.

A white phosphorous attack in the 17th of January on an UNRWA school in Beit La’hia, where 1,500 people sought refuge. 2 five and seven year old children died, and many were fatally injured. Photo: Muhammad al Baba
From the multitude of incidents documented, I’ve chosen only three. They are described in the detailed reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch during last year. Contrary to those organizations false image in the Israeli public, their activity does not focus only on Israel, their activists are spread around the world. Moreover, both this organizations (like the Israeli B’zelem) systematically denounce Hamas, Hezbollah or any other enemy of Israel crimes of war as well. They employ investigators who take testimonies, legal experts, doctors and weapon experts. One who reads their reports and brushes them of as “Palestinian propaganda” (the IDF spokesman) makes himself look absurd, especially compared to the dry slogans, void of documentations, that the IDF presents as “operational inquiries”.
1. synopsis: a drone fired a missile that killed two youths, 12 and 17 years old, who played on the rooftop of an apartments building. On their bodies and on the surroundings were found physical evidences of drone missiles fire.
On January 4, 2009, the second day of Israel’s ground offensive, at around 10:30 a.m., an IDF drone launched a missile at two boys playing on the rooftop of a two-story home in downtown Gaza City [GPS 31.51243/034.45655]. According to residents, the site was at least five kilometers from any fighting at the time between the IDF and Palestinian armed groups. IDF statements and media reports also report no fighting in that area at that time; Israeli forces did not enter central Gaza City until later in the ground offensive. Because the house is surrounded by taller buildings in the center of Gaza City, it is a highly unlikely site for firing rockets, and it would be a poor location for artillery spotting or reconnaissance.
Those killed were:
- Mahmud Khaled ‘Alayyan al- Masharawi, 12
- Ahmad Khader Diyab Subayh, 17
“Our neighborhood was very calm at that time,” Mahmud’s brother, Ashraf Mashhrawi, 30, a freelance television cameraman who runs an independent news agency, told Human Rights Watch. “The tanks were more than five kilometers away to the northeast.” According to Mashhrawi, many members of his extended family had sought refuge in his home because they believed the area was relatively safe. He said that various family members had gone to the roof that morning to play, but only Mahmud and Ahmad were up there when the missile struck.[34]
Ashraf ‘Issawi, a neighbor who was in the doorway of the house when the missile hit and was the first to reach the victims on the roof, told Human Rights Watch about the attack. “I had heard drones overhead and then there was an explosion and everyone was screaming,” he said. “I ran up to the roof and found the boys’ bodies. Ahmad’s leg was next to Mahmud who was still alive.”[35]
Human Rights Watch researchers examined the rooftop of the building and found small cubic fragments, circuit boards, and blast patterns that were consistent with drone-launched missiles. They also examined fragments of clothing that the family said the children were wearing at the time of the attack. The clothes were perforated with dozens of tiny holes. Photos and a video of the children taken by Ashraf ‘Issawi at the time of the attack show that the bodies were also perforated with dozens of tiny square wounds.[36] The incident was filmed by Ashraf’s cameraman and later used in a documentary produced by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
Human Rights Watch has uncovered no evidence that the two boys on the roof were fighters or that they were otherwise directly participating in the hostilities. Given the optical capacity of the drones, the young age of the boys should have been apparent to the operator. And the location of the roof, deep in the center of Gaza City, was a poor location for engagement or artillery spotting. The absence of IDF ground forces in Gaza City as of that date, January 4, further undermines any military justifications for the attack.
From the Human Rights Watch report
The use of drones in “Cast Lead” arouses many questions (on the broader questions that their use arouses, see here). The Amnesty International report which also documented the use of drones against civilians ponders this:
Surveillance drones have exceptionally good optics, allowing those watching to see details
such as the type and colour of the items of clothing worn by those being observed, and what
kind of objects they are carrying. For example, on 4 February 2009 an Israeli drone operator
explained: “We identified a terrorist that looked like an Israeli soldier. Our camera enabled us
to see him very clearly. He was wearing a green parka jacket and he was walking around with
a huge radio that looked exactly like an army radio. We saw that he was not wearing an army
helmet, and he was ducking down with a weapon close to the wall, wearing black trousers. It
was very clear he wasn’t a soldier”.29 According to the Israeli army, “pilots can divert missiles
already en route to their targets to avoid striking civilians”.30 The questions arising from the
cases detailed in this report and many others are why so many children and other individuals who were visibly civilians were targeted in the first place and why these missiles were not diverted when it became clear that they were about to strike children and other civilians
The IDF, as usual, avoided providing a serious answer. But fortunately enough in the body of testimonies gathered by “Breaking the Silence” organization after the operation the answer could be found. A soldier tells that in the briefing it was made clear to him that going on the rooftops is strictly prohibited because “the air force have a green light to shoots on anybody on the roofs – in fact, without having to distinguish between a fighter and a civilian”. Here is the testimony.
One who connects between the evidences of firing on civilians on the rooftops with this testimony will reach the unavoidable conclusion: the Israeli drone operators were conducting under clearly unlawful orders. They and their commanders – the entire chain of command to the air force commander – took part in committing crimes of war. But who will make this connection? The IDF? The same IDF that waved the HRW drones report as “based on unknown, unreliable Palestinian sources that their military expertise isn’t verified, and they are driven by clear interests as part of the propaganda system in Gaza?” The same IDF that waved the “Breaking the Silence” testimonies as “hearsay and second hand testimonies”?
The IDF did not connect, will not connect and cannot connect this connection. The testimonies and the findings are laid before us and before the entire world. One who is able to make this connection – must do it.
2. synopsis: white phosphorous shells (forbidden to be used near civilian population) directly hit the house of Abu Halima in Saiapha in the north of the Gaza strip, killed five family members and wounded five more. In the scene unmistakable remnants of phosphorous were found and doctors verified that the survivors’ burns were from a new kind which they didn’t know before.
In separate interviews, three members of the family told Human Rights Watch what happened that afternoon, around 4 pm, when an artillery shell containing white phosphorus directly hit their house, killing five members of the family and wounding five. The testimony is consistent with accounts given to journalists and the Israel-based human rights group B’Tselem.
Ahmad Abu Halima, the 22-year-old son of Sa`dallah and Sabah Abu Halima, who was inside the house at the time of the attack, told Human Rights Watch what he saw:
I was talking with my father when the shell landed. It hit directly on my father and cut his head off. The explosion was large and the smell unbearable. It caused a big fire. The pieces [from the shell] were burning and we could not put them out… We ran outside, the four of us who were unharmed. My brother’s wife and daughter, Ghada and Farah, came down with no clothes [because they were burned off]. My brothers Yusif and Ali too. Yusif was burned on his face and Ali on his back[49]
Ahmed’s brother Omar Abu Halima, 18 years old, was next door at his uncle’s house when the shell struck:
I heard the sound of an explosion. We ran into the street and saw that it had hit our house. We ran upstairs and when we arrived I found my father and four others dead. We took them out and then dealt with the four wounded.
The stairs were very smoky. We went inside and it smelled very strange. We had never experienced that before. It was difficult to go forward. First I saw my mother with burns coming out of the house. We found her at the entrance. She told us to go in and get my injured brothers. But when we got inside we saw nothing because of the smoke and dust, and we couldn’t breathe. We found my brother’s wife, Ghada, she was burning in flames, and also her daughter Farah, also burning. There were also my brothers Yusif and Ali. All of them were burning badly; their clothes were melting. They were all burned but Abd al-Rahim and my father had their heads cut from their bodies too. We took the wounded in two tractors, with my mother in the first one. We tried to call an ambulance but they said they couldn’t come.[50]

R’ada Abu Halima who got burned in a white phosphorous attack on her house in Beit La’hia in the 3rd of January, were dying for two and a half months in a hospital in Cairo and died in the 29th of March. More on the incident – here. Photo: Muhammad Sabach, “B’zelem”.
On January 23, Human Rights Watch investigated the Abu Halima house. In the ceiling above the hallway where the family said it had been sheltering, researchers saw a hole approximately one meter in diameter, apparently caused by the shell. The hallway beneath was badly charred and the remaining furniture burnt. The rooms around the hallway had black burns on the walls and the plastic light switches and electrical outlets had melted. The wood around the doors and windows of the house was charred. On the wall in one bedroom, someone had written in lipstick, in Arabic with some misspellings: “From the Israel Defense Forces, we are sorry.”[51] Residents do not know if IDF forces entered the houses of the neighborhood because they all fled, but the tank positions about 100 meters to the east of the Abu Halima house indicate that the forces were nearby.
Amid the debris of the family’s possessions, Human Rights Watch found two 155mm artillery shell fragments, painted the light green color that militaries use to identify white phosphorus shells, as well as the base plate from the shell. Two canisters of the sort used to hold white phosphorus in artillery shells were found outside the house. Another white phosphorus shell and canister were found about 20 meters to the west of the house, and a third shell was about 50 meters from the house in the same direction. Human Rights Watch does not know if any of the shells struck at precisely those spots or whether they had been moved.
Human Rights Watch spoke with Dr. ‘Alaa ‘Ali from the al-Shifa Hospital burn unit, where Sabah Abu Halima was getting care. He said that she had been admitted on January 4 at 5:05 p.m., and he showed hospital entry records confirming that date and time. “Sabah had very deep burns that reached the bone, and in some places even burned the bone,” he said.[53]
From the Human Rights Watch report.
3. Synopsis Flechettes shells (forbidden to use near populated areas) landed near family house in Izbet Beit Hanoun, killed two children, a woman and three men, wounded several others. The wounded carry Flechettes darts in their backs.
Flechettes are 3.5cm-long steel darts, sharply pointed at the front, with four fins at the rear. Between 5,000 and 8,000 of these darts are packed into shells which are generally fired from tanks. The shells explode in the air and scatter the flechettes in a conical pattern over an area about 300m by 100m.65
On 5 January 2009, Israeli forces fired several flechette shells into the main road near the Abd al-Dayem family home in ‘Izbet Beit Hanoun, to the south-west of Beit Hanoun. Six civilians – two children, a woman and three men – were killed and several others were injured. Twelve-year-old Arafat Abd al-Dayem was killed instantly and 16-year-old Islam Jaber Abd al-Dayem was struck in the neck by flechettes. He was taken to hospital but died three days later. Mizar, his brother, was injured in the same attack and still has a flechette lodged in his back.
Nearby, 21-year-old Wafa’ Abu Jarad, who was pregnant, her two-year-old son, her husband, her father and her brother-in-law were all injured by flechettes in the courtyard of their home. Wafa’ died of her injuries two days later. Her husband, Mohammed, told Amnesty International: “We had just had breakfast, then we had tea. We walked a bit in the garden, to the corner of the house, just a few metres from the front door. Then we heard shelling, followed by screaming. We turned back, towards the door. As we got to the door, we were hit. Wafa’ fell on the steps. There was blood everywhere.”
X-rays show that Wafa’s husband still has a flechette lodged in his back, which doctors cannot remove because it is so near his spinal cord they fear performing such an operation on him could result in him being paralysed.
From the Amnesty International report, page 39
As said, those are just samples, other severe deeds, to the extent of actual massacres, were also documented. The massacre of the Samuni family in Zaitun. The massacre in UNRWA school in Gebalia, and the most murderous action, the one that defined the character of the operation from day one – the killing of 248 cops in air raids on their barracks.
The Spirit of the Commander
Those shocking evidences and proofs, supposedly, contradict the image of the IDF and his soldiers as a moral army which takes care not to needlessly hit civilians. But whoever listened to the voices that came from within the IDF itself, from the fighting branches, knows very well the image is false. Not only Palestinians, but IDF soldiers and commanders testified that in “Cast Lead” several red lines were crossed.
Most of the testimonies were given anonymously in a brochure published by the “Breaking the Silence” organization an in fighters discussions in the Rabin preparatory program in Oranim college. Those where immediately accepted with distrust or in the worse case – vile incitement. Everybody hanged on the anonymity of the testifiers as proof for their testimonies fallacy, forgetting in the process that it is a well known and accepted procedure in the investigations of crimes and corruptions. People within the system who wants to expose its crime to the light of day but don’t want to pay a personal price for it – have no choice but to keep their anonymity. Sure, anonymous testimonies don’t prove anything, their goal is to push the relevant bodies to investigate. But the total ignoring of them, and denying them without any investigation – that certainly proves a lot.
And anyway, not all the testimonies were anonymous. Notice this soldier, face revealed, describing the briefing he got from the 312 brigade commander. “You open fire and don’t ask any questions”, “a building stands in your way – shoot it”, “there are no innocents – anybody there is the enemy”.
On the 19th of March channel 10 published a video of a company commander briefing his soldiers before action in Gaza. The commander states:
“We are going to war, we are not in a routine security action or anything else. I want you to be aggressive. Anything suspicious in a floor of a house – we throw shells on it. We suspect a building now, we take the building down… no second thoughts. If it is them or us, then it is them. A person walks unarmed toward us – shoot in the air. Continues to walk – this person is dead. Nobody thinks twice. Let the mistakes be on their lives, not ours”.
Arik Dubnov, in the reconnaissance company of a reserve brigade told a journalist:
“From the first briefings before going in, it was clear that the army had changed its entire mindset. Instead of getting the usual precautions on not harming civilians, we were told about the need to make a very aggressive entry. We were told: ‘any sign of danger, open up with massive fire’. In previous training, we prepared for fighting against guerrilla forces, but this time they told us that we would be facing Hamas fighting in full military formation – something that, obviously, did not happen. Some of us were very uncomfortable with these orders, others were pleased that finally the IDF was taking off the kid gloves. I suppose that it boils down to people’s political background. When it was over, both right- and left-wingers felt that it had been a pointless exercise. The rightists said we hadn’t gone far enough, the leftists said, why did we do it to begin with? But we didn’t talk much about it.”
Amir Marmor, a gunner in a tank crew of a reserve armored battalion that operated in Jabalya told a journalist:
“The operation was marketed to us and the entire nation as a measured retaliation to the Hamas attacks, but to me it was like a punishment exercise. That was what it seemed like from the enormous extent of the destruction. We were there for a week and despite the fact that no-one fired on us, the firing and demolitions continued incessantly. I am very doubtful how many of the demolitions can be justified. We were told to expect incoming fire from various directions; our first reaction was to blow up or bulldozer houses in a given direction so as to give us better lines of fire. But then no fire came from that direction, or any other. On another occasion we were told that an attack was expected and an artillery barrage was fired, but we didn’t see anyone moving there.
Those testimonies, coming from non anonymous witnesses, correlate wit IDF investigations about the uncontrolled destruction of houses and buildings during the operation. “The investigations revealed that in many cases commanders ordered to demolish buildings who limited the “eyesight” for IDF stations, or because the commanders thought them as potential threats. In other cases houses were demolished because a makeshift bomb or a Kalashnikov gun were found within, even if controlled demolition which will cause less damage to the house was available. Dozens of houses were demolished because of an unverified suspicion of tunnels being dug in the vicinity”.
If the commanders don’t take Palestinian civilians into account, no wonder that the simple soldiers didn’t. Correction they did take them into account, death camps style: “one down, 999,999 to go”. This writing and other racist slur were sprayed on houses walls in Gaza (among others on the walls of the Samuni family house that indeed was massacred horrifyingly)

Graffiti left by Giv’ati soldiers in Zaitun. Photo: AFP
When you add up the findings of the HRW and Amnesty International investigations, with the soldiers’ testimonies and their briefings, all the question marks go away. Why were so many civilians hit? Because the soldiers were order to consider everyone as “enemy”. Why did brutal ammo as white phosphorous flechettes fired on civilian population, in contrast to rules of war? Because the shooter and his commander denied the need to distinguish between fighters and civilians, between guilty and innocent: “there are no innocents”. This, in short, is the definition of terror.
The Investigation of Crimes
A year after “Cast Lead”, the IDF has proven he is not able to investigate itself honestly and effectively. The gap between the quantity of incidents of shooting of civilians and their severity, as documented by human rights organizations, and the lack and superficiality of the incidents investigated by the IDF – this gap is unbearable.
The obvious conclusion is that the investigation should have been taken out of the IDF hands in the first place. Alas, in the Israeli side there was no one to reach this conclusion himself. Thus, after a winded web of denials, half mouthed admitions and, mostly, repeating the mantra “Hamas made a cynical use of the civilian population” – Israel pushed itself into a dead-end.
On one hand, it is clear to all that the severity and the scope of the findings necessitate an investigation, on the other hand, it is clear that after a year, an effective investigation is impossible. The physical evidence – ammo remnants, tanks marks, broken walls – were already removed. Eyesight testimonies and hearsays taken today would be, naturally, less reliable from the ones taken when the memory was fresh.
In other words, the most reliable findings are the ones that were already meticulously gathered by human rights organizations in real time. The only question is whether anybody in Israel will dare to use those findings. For, what do the voices calling for an “external” investigation for “cast Lead” events hope for? One can hope they don’t want just another committee that all she’ll see and hear will be soldiers’ testimonies. And if so, there is no alternative to using the evidences, the photos and the findings that are available outside of Israel.
And why not? Why won’t an Israeli court, or a national investigative committee summon experts who checked the scene, and ask them to sign an oathed statements saying that they stand behind their reports? Why not summon Palestinian witnesses and re-interrogate them thoroughly on their given testimonies?
In short, why not use the usual juridical process, were the court is given the evidences and decide by accepted methods about their reliability? What other way can refute all the claims those “Israel Haters” spread throughout the world and the internet?
This is a dissembling question. Nothing of the mentioned above will be done. When Israel charged the IDF to investigate “Cast Lead”, she knew very well what she’s doing. And when she’s refusing, for more than 7 months, to answer B’zelem’s, Amnesty’s, HRW’s and the UN’s queries in regard to hundreds of well documented incidents of civilians being hit (the IDF refuses to reveal even the list of casualties in Gaza, according to his own data), she, again, knows what she’s doing. Only a gullible person (or a crook) will believe that Israel denies all those external investigations because she intends to investigate those incidents herself, outside of the army. This denial, as the hundreds of horrifying evidences from Gaza, shines as a beacon of shame on the face of the state, and clarifies its guilt.
The next attack on Gaza, as has been already declared, is a matter of time. One who doesn’t want to see his state yet again committing horrible crimes in his name, even worse crimes than in “Cast Lead”, and then avoids responsibility yet again, shakes the gunpowder off her clothes, whitens the blood of the innocents, and happily skips into the horizon of her undeniable righteousness – should decide even today where he or she will stand in the first day of the attack and on the last one.
written by Idan Landau, published in his hebrew blog “Lo Lamut Tipesh”












[...] (An interesting example of this sort of thinking was recently published (Hebrew) in the right-wing Channel 7 radio station. A rabbi heading a pre-military academy, Rabbi Zeev Sharon, was interviewed saying that a soldier who killed a civilian during war time should not be put on trial, because the civilians of the enemy are themselves the enemy. A similar example was revealed by human rights organization Shovrim Shtika – see the discussion and video on one soldier’s account of getting orders to this effect here.) [...]